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ALTERNATIVES TO THE GIFT AND  
ESTATE TAX 
DAVID G. DUFF* 
Abstract: Following the near-death experience of the federal gift and estate 
tax in 2010, the hundredth anniversary of the tax represents an ideal moment 
to reflect on the role of this tax and whether an alternative approach might be 
more desirable and sustainable. This Article examines four prominent alterna-
tives to the current tax: an annual wealth tax, taxing unrealized gains at death, 
including gifts and inheritances in income, and a lifetime accessions tax that 
would apply to the cumulative value of gifts and inheritances received by in-
dividuals over their lifetimes. In order to assess these alternatives, the Article 
reconsiders the reasons for taxing wealth transfers, arguing that the primary 
purpose of a wealth transfer tax is not to raise revenue or enhance progressivi-
ty, but to regulate intergenerational transfers of wealth in order to reduce un-
earned concentrations of wealth and power and promote fair equality of op-
portunity. On this basis, it argues that a lifetime accessions tax is an attractive 
alternative to the current tax. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the current incarnation of the gift and estate tax approaches its cen-
tennial, it is an ideal time to reflect on its role and its prospects. Although the 
tax survived a near-death experience in 2010, its role in the federal tax system 
is significantly diminished from what it was only fifteen years ago—which 
was itself arguably diminished from what it was fifty years before that.1 De-
spite substantial increases in the tax-exempt threshold and significantly re-
duced revenues, the tax has managed to survive—at least for now. For advo-
cates of wealth transfer taxation such as myself,2 this might be regarded as a 
major accomplishment, particularly given the intensive campaign that has 
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 1 Paul L. Caron, The One-Hundredth Anniversary of the Federal Estate Tax: It’s Time to 
Renew Our Vows, 57 B.C. L. REV. 823 (2016). 
 2 David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 
5 (1993). 
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been waged against the tax since the late 1980s,3 and the repeal of these taxes 
in several developed counties over the last several decades.4 
Given this experience, one might wonder whether alternatives to the 
gift and estate tax might be more desirable, and perhaps more sustainable. 
Might it be better, for example, to replace infrequent taxes on intergenera-
tional transfers of wealth with a more frequent tax applied to annual net 
wealth holdings? Should the federal government follow Canada’s example 
from forty years ago by abandoning gift and estate tax and taxing unrealized 
gains when property is transferred by gift or at death? Might it be better to 
include gifts and inheritances in income, as Henry Simons suggested eighty 
years ago,5 the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation recommended in 
1966,6 and others have proposed more recently?7 Or should the federal gov-
ernment retain a distinct wealth transfer tax, but apply it to recipients, rather 
than donors, in the form of a lifetime accessions tax on the cumulative value 
of gifts and inheritances received by individuals over the course of their 
lifetimes? 
This Article considers each of these alternatives to the current gift and 
estate tax, arguing that a lifetime accessions tax best fulfills the primary 
purpose of a wealth transfer tax to reduce concentrations of inherited 
wealth, and would be easier to defend and justify than the existing gift and 
estate tax. Part I considers the reasons for taxing wealth transfers, arguing 
that the primary purpose of a tax on wealth transfers is neither to raise reve-
nue nor to enhance the progressivity of the overall tax system, but to regu-
late intergenerational transfers of wealth in order to reduce unearned con-
centrations of wealth and power and ensure what John Rawls calls “fair 
equality of opportunity.”8 From this perspective, Part II considers four al-
ternatives to the current gift and estate tax—an annual wealth tax, a tax on 
unrealized gains at death, the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in income, 
and a lifetime accessions tax—and concludes that the last of these options 
                                                                                                                           
 3 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 1–217 (2006). 
 4 David G. Duff, The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 71, 72 (2005). 
 5 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 125–47 (1938). 
 6 3 ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION: 
TAXATION OF INCOME 41 (1966). 
 7 See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Com-
prehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1 (2009) (proposing adoption of an income tax on 
received bequests and gifts); Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including 
Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978) (analyzing the benefits and draw-
backs to taxation of adding bequests and gifts as income). 
 8 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73, 83–89 (1971) (introducing the principle of 
“fair equality of opportunity”); infra notes 14–80 and accompanying text. 
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would serve the primary purpose of a wealth transfer tax more effectively 
than the others, and would be easier to defend and justify than the existing 
gift and estate tax system.9  
I. WHY TAX WEALTH TRANSFERS? 
In order to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of the cur-
rent U.S. gift and estate tax and possible alternatives, it is essential to de-
termine the key purpose or purposes that this tax (and wealth transfer taxes 
more generally) is intended to serve. This Part considers four rationales that 
are generally advanced: (1) revenue-raising (section A);10 (2) distributing 
the tax burden equitably (section B);11 (3) curbing concentrations of wealth 
(section C);12 and (4) regulating intergenerational transfers of wealth (sec-
tion D).13 While the first two rationales were central to the introduction of 
wealth transfer taxes in the United States and other developed countries, 
and each of these rationales may have a role to play in defending an existing 
wealth transfer tax, only the fourth provides a compelling account for a dis-
tinct tax on wealth transfers.  
A. Raising Revenue 
Although it is often recognized that taxes can be imposed for different 
purposes, including redistribution and regulation in addition to revenue 
generation,14 it is generally assumed that the primary purpose of any tax is 
to raise revenue. Not surprisingly, raising revenue is often identified as a 
key purpose of the U.S. gift and estate tax and other taxes on the transfer of 
wealth.15 
Historically, in fact, revenue generation appears to have been a princi-
pal reason why governments have introduced wealth transfer taxes. In the 
United States, wealth transfer taxes of one form or another were enacted in 
1797, 1862, and 1898—in each case to finance impending or actual war—
and repealed once these revenue needs had passed.16 In 1916, the current 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 81–108 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 14–37 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 38–56 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 68–80 and accompanying text. 
 14 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006) 
(specifying revenue generation, redistribution, and regulation as three functions of the U.S. tax sys-
tem). 
 15 See, e.g., Caron, supra note 1, at 824–30 (discussing taxing transfers of wealth at death as a 
means of raising revenue). 
 16 Id. at 824–25; Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 
225–27 (1956). 
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estate tax was introduced to address paramount revenue needs related to 
World War I.17 Revenue considerations were also central to the introduction 
of a progressive estate duty in the United Kingdom in 1894,18 a national 
estate duty in Australia in 1914,19 and a federal succession duty in Canada 
in 1941.20 
Notwithstanding these origins, however, wealth transfer taxes have 
never played a major role in the revenue systems of these countries, and 
assumed an increasingly marginal role after World War II as governments in 
most developed countries turned to income, consumption, and social securi-
ty taxes as the main sources of tax revenue. Although the ratio of U.S. gift 
and estate taxes to total federal tax revenues rose from 0.6% in 1917 to 
2.8% in 1921 and 4.6% in 1941, this ratio declined to 2.0% in 1971 and 
1.4% in 2001, and is projected to be only 0.6% in 2015.21 In the United 
Kingdom, estate tax revenues accounted for 16.1% of total tax revenues 
from 1908 to 1915,22 but declined to slightly more than 4% from 1949 to 
1965,23 between 2.2% and 2.7% from 1965 to 1972, and 0.5% to 0.8% since 
1982.24 In Australia, the national estate duty accounted for only 2% to 4% 
of federal tax revenues from 1914 to 1940 and no more than 1.4% of federal 
tax revenues after World War II,25 whereas federal wealth transfer taxes in 
Canada never contributed more than 1.7% of federal tax revenues.26 More-
over, among Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(“OECD”) countries that continue to levy estate, inheritance, or gift taxes, 
the percentage of total tax revenues these taxes raised ranges from 0.1% to 
no more than 1.6% for the most recent year for which complete statistics are 
available.27 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 230–31. 
 18 C.T. SANDFORD, TAXING INHERITANCE AND CAPITAL GAINS: TOWARDS A COMPREHEN-
SIVE SYSTEM OF CAPITAL TAXATION 13–14 (1967). 
 19 JULIE P. SMITH, TAXING POPULARITY: THE STORY OF TAXATION IN AUSTRALIA 45 
(1993). 
 20 Duff, supra note 4, at 87. 
 21 Caron, supra note 1, at 827 tbl.1. 
 22 CEDRIC T. SANDFORD, TAXING PERSONAL WEALTH 68 tbl.2.5 (1971). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Revenue Statistics—Comparative Tables, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV# [https://perma.cc/FE8Y-K7TT] [hereinafter OECD] 
(next to “Government” select “Total”; next to “Tax” select “4300 Estate, inheritance and gift tax-
es”; change the “Variable” dimension to “Tax revenue as % of total taxation” by clicking “Cus-
tomize,” then “Selection,” then “Variable,” then check the box next to only “Tax revenue as % of 
total taxation”). 
 25 Peter Saunders, An Australian Perspective on Wealth Taxation, in TAXATION ISSUES OF 
THE 1980S, at 397, 398–99 (John G. Head ed., 1983). 
 26 Duff, supra note 4, at 87. 
 27 OECD, supra note 24. 
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In contrast to these small percentages, the OECD reports that “income 
profits and capital gains taxes” generally accounted for between 25% and 
60% of total tax revenues in OECD countries in 2012,28 representing 46.9% 
of all U.S. taxes, 35.6% of U.K. taxes, 58.1% of Australian taxes, and 
47.4% of Canadian taxes.29 For the same year, general taxes on goods and 
services typically accounted for 20% to 30% of total tax revenues, though 
these figures were noticeably lower in the United States (8.2%), which does 
not levy a federal sales tax, as well as Australia (12.4%) and Canada 
(14.3%), where value-added taxes are levied at much lower rates than in 
other OECD countries.30 Together with social security contributions, which 
generally account for 20% to 40% of tax revenues in OECD countries,31 
these taxes have become the primary sources of government revenue among 
developed countries since World War II, greatly eclipsing the role that 
wealth transfer taxes once played. 
For some commentators, the declining role of these taxes as a source 
of government revenue is a cause for concern, particularly “at a time of 
acute need for additional federal revenues.”32 For this reason, one scholar 
has proposed “restoring the estate tax’s historic role in the federal tax sys-
tem” in order to increase projected tax revenues over the 2016–25 period 
from $250 billion to $500 billion to $1 trillion.33 
Given the structural deficit and increasing federal debt, it is reasonable 
to expect that revenue considerations will continue to contribute to the ar-
gument for retaining the gift and estate tax—particularly given the political 
resistance to other tax reforms that might increase federal revenues. None-
theless, there are three reasons why revenue generation should not be re-
garded as a primary rationale for the existence and design of these taxes. 
First, although an original intent of these taxes may have been to raise 
revenue, this purpose preceded the development of broad-based income, 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. (next to “Government” select “Total”; next to “Tax” select “1000 Taxes on income, 
profits, and capital gains”; change the “Variable” dimension to “Tax revenue as % of total taxa-
tion” by clicking “Customize,” then “Selection,” then “Variable,” then check the box next to only 
“Tax revenue as % of total taxation”). Outliers with less revenue from these sources include the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. (next to “Government” select “Total”; next to “Tax” select “5110 General taxes on 
goods and services”; change the “Variable” dimension to “Tax revenue as % of total taxation” by 
clicking “Customize,” then “Selection,” then “Variable,” then check the box next to only “Tax 
revenue as % of total taxation”). 
 31 Id. (next to “Government” select “Total”; next to “Tax” select “2000 Social security contri-
butions (SSC)”; change the “Variable” dimension to “Tax revenue as % of total taxation” by 
clicking “Customize,” then “Selection,” then “Variable,” then check the box next to only “Tax 
revenue as % of total taxation”). 
 32 Caron, supra note 1, at 830. 
 33 Id. 
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consumption, and payroll taxes that have proven much more effective (and 
often more efficient) at raising revenue over the last seventy years. As a re-
sult, to rely on this original intent to restore the “historic role” of the U.S. 
gift and estate tax is to disregard one hundred years of fiscal experience and 
innovation that recommends other methods of raising revenue. 
Second, to make revenue generation a central purpose of a wealth 
transfer tax may favor certain design features that could contradict the pri-
mary contemporary purpose of these taxes: to regulate the intergenerational 
transfer of wealth in order to reduce inherited concentrations of wealth and 
power and ensure fair equality of opportunity. To the extent that revenue 
considerations favor lower thresholds, for example, these taxes may apply 
more broadly than is necessary to achieve those goals. Revenue objectives 
may also oppose exemptions for spousal transfers and charitable donations, 
which are common features of most wealth transfer taxes and broadly com-
patible with its primary objectives. Indeed, to the extent that a wealth trans-
fer tax reduces the concentration of wealth and encourages a broader distri-
bution of gifts and inheritances in order to benefit from tax-exempt thresh-
olds and lower rates, it is arguable that “the less revenue they raise the more 
effectively they are achieving their purpose.”34 
Finally, although there is undoubtedly some truth to the argument that 
“a tax must have a revenue raising rationale if it is going to endure the 
changing moods of national social policies,”35 experience in several devel-
oped countries suggests that this rationale is not sufficient to prevent the 
repeal of wealth transfer taxes given the limited revenue that they are likely 
to raise compared to other taxes that developed countries have come to rely 
on over the past century. On the contrary, experience in Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand over the past forty years suggests that wealth transfer tax-
es will become politically vulnerable when the real value of exemptions 
erodes through inflation and the tax applies more broadly to a larger per-
centage of the population36—as also occurred in the United States from 
1951 to 1981 when the exemption remained unchanged at $60,000 and the 
seeds of the “anti-death tax” movement were sown.37 As a result, although 
the current $5 million threshold is probably much higher than would be ide-
al to properly regulate the intergenerational transfer of wealth, increased 
thresholds were politically essential to preserve the gift and estate tax, not-
withstanding their consequences for raising revenue. 
                                                                                                                           
 34 SANDFORD, supra note 22, at 156. 
 35 David Frederick, Historical Lessons from the Life and Death of the Federal Estate Tax, 49 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 213 (2007). 
 36 Duff, supra note 4, at 116–20. 
 37 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 12–23. 
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B. Tax Equity 
A second rationale for taxing wealth transfers is the role that these tax-
es may play in the equitable distribution of the overall tax burden. When 
Congress first passed the estate tax in 1916, for example, the House com-
mittee report criticized excessive U.S. reliance on consumption taxes on the 
grounds that “such taxes bear most heavily upon those least able to pay 
them”38—proposing instead that “[the] revenue system should be more 
evenly and equitably balanced and a larger portion of our necessary reve-
nues collected from incomes and inheritances of those deriving the most 
benefit and protection from the Government.”39 In this way, the committee 
simultaneously invoked traditional tax equity principles favoring the distri-
bution of taxes according to ability to pay or benefits received. 
Although the benefit principle of tax equity has a lengthy history in 
liberal theory and may usefully support the imposition of specific benefit-
related taxes and user fees,40 it is hopelessly indeterminate as a rationale for 
any general tax base.41 Thomas Hobbes, for example, relied on the principle 
to justify both a head tax and a consumption tax, arguing alternately that 
equal taxation of the poor and the rich was justified on the basis that both 
received the same benefit from the commonwealth, namely “the enjoyment 
of life,” and that the benefits that individuals enjoy under the common-
wealth are best measured by what they consume.42 On the other hand, John 
Locke appears to have employed the benefit principle to support a tax on 
personal wealth, whether imposed during the taxpayer’s life or at death, on 
the grounds that “everyone who enjoys his share of the protection” provided 
by the state “should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance 
of it.”43 In contrast, Adam Smith invoked the same principle as a rationale 
for income taxation, arguing that “[t]he subject of every state ought to con-
tribute towards the support of the government . . . in proportion to the reve-
nue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”44 
                                                                                                                           
 38 H. REP. NO. 64-922, at 2 (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 22, 23. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., David G. Duff, Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice, 54 U. TO-
RONTO L.J. 391 (2004) (explaining the theory and practice of benefit taxation, and supporting the 
use of benefit taxes and user fees as an element of a tax system that also includes redistributive 
taxes). 
 41 David G. Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical Review, 
18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23, 31–34 (2005). 
 42 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 386–87 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1985) (1651). 
 43 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 74 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
(1690). 
 44 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 350 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776). 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, most equity-based arguments for tax-
ing wealth transfers have tended to emphasize taxation according to ability to 
pay. Within this general framework, moreover, it is possible to discern two 
alternative equity arguments for taxing wealth transfers: (1) that these taxes 
contribute to the overall progressivity or vertical equity of the tax system by 
imposing a larger tax burden on those with a greater ability to pay; and (2) 
that these taxes contribute to horizontal equity by measuring an ability to pay 
that is not otherwise recognized by the tax system. Neither approach provides 
a persuasive rationale for a distinct tax on the transfer of wealth. 
1. Vertical Equity 
Although wealth transfer taxes may raise relatively little revenue com-
pared to other taxes, they are often defended on the grounds that they con-
tribute to the overall progressivity of the tax system. According to one 
scholar, for example, “we must look elsewhere than the production of reve-
nues if we are to justify strengthening, rather than eliminating, the estate 
tax”—emphasizing “its role in the distribution of the tax burden, in particu-
lar its role in providing an important element of progressivity in the federal 
tax system.”45 Others have advanced a similar rationale for the gift and es-
tate tax, arguing that “historic reductions in the progressivity of the tax sys-
tem” make “revitalization of the estate tax” an essential campaign in “the 
broader tax reform war.”46 
Although initially appealing to anyone who supports progressive taxa-
tion, this rationale for taxing wealth transfers is ultimately no more persua-
sive than the revenue-raising rationale considered earlier. First, the argu-
ment is radically incomplete to the extent that it does not itself justify pro-
gressive taxation—which is difficult to accomplish under a narrow concep-
tion of tax equity as equality of sacrifice,47 but arguably easier to defend 
under broader conceptions of distributive justice, which regard progressive 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 270 (1983). 
 46 Caron, supra note 1, at 836; see also Maureen Maloney, Distributive Justice: That Is the 
Wealth Tax Issue, 20 OTTAWA L. REV. 601, 611 (1988) (“The most powerful arguments in favour 
of some type of wealth taxation are based on ensuring progressivity and enhancing equality of 
opportunity objectives in the Canadian tax system.”). 
 47 Although it is often assumed that a diminishing marginal utility of income or wealth favors 
progressive taxation in order to equalize the absolute burden or disutility of taxation among differ-
ently situated taxpayers, this is true only where the percentage reduction in the utility of income or 
wealth is greater than the percentage increase in income or wealth. See A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN 
PUBLIC FINANCE 85–86 (3d rev. ed. 1947) (noting that the “law of diminishing utility” establishes 
only that “the last £1 of a £1000 income carries less satisfaction than the last £1 of a £100 income 
does,” whereas progressivity requires that “the last £10 of a £1000 income carry less satisfaction 
than the last £1 of a £100 income,” which “the law of diminishing utility does not assert”). For an 
excellent discussion of equal sacrifice theories of tax equity, see Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, 
Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 455–61 (1952). 
2016] Alternatives to the Gift and Estate Tax 901 
taxes as a kind of premium to insure against the risk of economic disad-
vantage.48 Second, because this rationale depends on the tax raising a mean-
ingful quantity of revenue to contribute to the overall progressivity of the 
tax burden, it is subject to the same objections against the revenue-raising 
rationale outlined earlier. Third, the contribution of the gift and estate tax to 
the overall progressivity of the tax system is generally assumed, rather than 
proven, without explaining the incidence of these taxes, nor the criterion by 
which this progressivity is measured.49 Fourth, assuming that the gift and 
estate tax contributes to the overall progressivity of the tax system, it is not 
obvious that this contribution is preferable to other measures that could en-
hance progressivity more directly, such as income tax base broadening and 
rate increases.50 Nor is it obvious that the redistributive goals underlying 
many arguments for tax progressivity are best achieved by the tax system 
alone, without regard to government expenditures that generally have a 
greater distributional impact than the distribution of tax burdens.51 For all 
these reasons, vertical equity or progressivity seems like an uncertain foun-
dation on which to construct a solid defense of a wealth transfer tax. 
2. Horizontal Equity 
An alternative equity-based rationale for the taxation of wealth transfers 
emphasizes the role of wealth as a measure of ability to pay that is not other-
wise recognized in the tax system, but ought to be if taxes are to be equitably 
distributed among taxpayers with the same ability to pay. According to one 
version of this argument, because income taxes generally exclude imputed 
income from property and usually apply to gains only when they are realized, 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 99–109 (2001) (analyzing a hypothetical insurance market operating under the theory 
of tax as premium). 
 49 Michael Graetz, for example, uses a crude methodology, comparing revenues from the gift 
and estate tax to revenues from income taxes above the average rate. See Graetz, supra note 45, at 
272. For a more sophisticated approach, which assumes that the gift and estate tax is borne primar-
ily by heirs and measures the distributional impact of the tax according to their economic income, 
see Batchelder, supra note 7, at 5–44. See also Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progres-
sive Is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 3, 3 (2007) (analyzing the progressivity of the U.S. tax system using tax return data). 
 50 Although it is often argued that wealth transfer taxes affect incentives to work and save less 
than income taxes of equal yield, the incentive effects of these taxes continue to be studied and 
debated. As a result, while a growing consensus appears to conclude that these incentive effects 
are not significant, economic analysis does not provide an obvious argument to prefer the taxation 
of wealth transfers to the taxation of high incomes earners. For a survey of recent studies, on the 
economic effects of the gift and estate tax, see Wojciech Kopczuk, Economics of Estate Taxation: 
Review of Theory and Evidence, 63 TAX L. REV. 139 (2009). 
 51 See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1630–37 (2005) (examin-
ing the tax system’s role in furthering retributive goals). 
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wealth taxation merits serious consideration as a complement or alternative to 
the taxation of income.52 As well, to the extent that wealth affords advantages 
of “opportunity, flexibility and security” beyond the income that it may gen-
erate, it is sometimes argued that these advantages should also be taken into 
account in computing a taxpayer’s ability to pay.53 From this perspective, as a 
report of a committee of the Institute for Fiscal Studies concluded in 1978, “a 
tax on the transfer of inherited wealth as it passes down from parent to child” 
might be justified as “in effect a periodic charge, levied once a generation, on 
the holding of such wealth.”54 
Whatever the merits of these horizontal equity arguments may be as ra-
tionales for the periodic taxation of wealth,55 they are deficient as justifica-
tions for the taxation of wealth transfers. First, because wealth transfer taxes 
exclude all accumulated wealth that is consumed before death, they are—as 
one commentator has aptly observed—“at best crude once-a-generation ap-
proximations” to periodic taxes on wealth.56 Second, the dynastic conception 
of the tax unit that is implicit in this justification for wealth transfer taxation 
contradicts the liberal emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities that 
underlies the most persuasive justification for wealth transfer taxes to mini-
mize unearned advantages from substantial inheritances and ensure fair 
equality of opportunity. For these reasons, horizontal equity is no more per-
suasive than vertical equity as a rationale for the taxation of wealth transfers. 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 
423 (2000) (exploring the possibility of “replacing the income tax with a cash flow consumption 
tax and a low rate, supplemental, ex ante wealth tax”); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Com-
prehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000) (discussing how a wealth tax would function 
and the consequences of its implementation). 
 53 Richard M. Bird, The Case for Taxing Personal Wealth, in CAN. TAX FOUND., REPORT OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD TAX CONFERENCE 6, 8 (1972); see also James Cutt, A 
Net Wealth Tax for Canada?, 17 CAN. TAX J. 298, 304 (1969) (“The argument that a wealth tax is 
inequitable in that property may not directly yield money income merely serves to emphasize the 
inadequacy of the definition of income used in computing economic well-being and consequent 
ability to pay taxes.”). 
 54 J.E. MEADE ET AL., INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT 
TAXATION 317 (1978); see also CARL S. SHOUP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 100–01, 
107–08 (1966) (proposing a transfer tax system that accounts for what Carl Shoup considers its 
three aims: “(1) taxation of windfalls, (2) taxation of property once a generation, and (3) taxation 
to reduce concentration”); W.D. Andrews, What’s Fair About Death Taxes?, 26 NAT’L TAX J. 
465, 466–67 (1973) (examining reactions to the “generation-skipping problem”). 
 55 To the extent that wealth represents deferred consumption in the form of lifetime savings, it 
is arguable that any additional ability to pay that is attributable to wealth at any particular time 
does not confer any greater ability to pay over the course of a lifetime, calling into question hori-
zontal equity arguments for taxing personal wealth. For a critical evaluation of wealth taxation 
from the perspective of distributive justice, see Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 
53 TAX L. REV. 263 (2000). 
 56 Bird, supra note 53, at 8. For similar observations, see SANDFORD, supra note 22, at 137; 
Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 
241, 248–51 (1988) (noting the limits of having a “once-a-generation” wealth tax). 
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C. Curbing Concentrations of Wealth 
A third rationale for taxing wealth transfers is to curb extreme concen-
trations of wealth, which can threaten democratic institutions, social stabil-
ity, and economic growth and prosperity.57 As Rawls observes, “when ine-
qualities of wealth exceed a certain limit,” democratic institutions are “put 
in jeopardy,” “political liberty likewise tends to lose its value, and repre-
sentative government . . . become[s] such in appearance only.”58 In addition, 
a growing body of empirical literature suggests that extreme inequalities 
undermine social stability and impede economic growth and prosperity by 
reducing aggregate demand for goods and services and lessening productiv-
ity-enhancing investments in education and public infrastructure.59 
As certain scholars have documented, after decreasing steadily from 
1929 to 1978, the concentration of wealth at the very top of the U.S. wealth 
distribution increased sharply from 1978 to 2012; the share of wealth held 
by the top 1% of households rose from approximately 23% to 41.8%, the 
share of wealth held by the top 0.1% of households increased from 7% to 
22%, and the share of wealth held by the top 0.01% of households increased 
from roughly 2.2% to 11.2% (which is higher than it was in the 1920s).60 
Studies also suggest that inherited wealth accounts for a substantial share of 
overall wealth,61 and that wealth transfer taxes can contribute to reductions 
in the concentration of wealth.62 For these reasons, it is not surprising that a 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Caron, supra note 1, at 837–42. 
 58 RAWLS, supra note 8, at 278. 
 59 For an excellent summary of this literature, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and 
Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831–40 (2001). For a more recent account, see Paul L. Caron & 
James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Eco-
nomic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1264–74 (2013). See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., IN IT TOGETHER: WHY LESS INEQUALITY BENEFITS ALL (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/
Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_97892
64235120-en [https://perma.cc/74T2-FC7V] (providing an overview of inequality trends and discuss-
ing the impact of wealth concentration); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 104–147 
(2012) (discussing why wealth inequality matters and its effects on America). 
 60 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: 
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 131 Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1, 
22 n.41 & tbl.1), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2016QJE.pdf [https://perma.cc/F55Q-
QN88]. 
 61 See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron & Alicia Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer Tax-
es, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 119, 131 (1992) (concluding that up to 52% of wealth is inherited); William 
G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 145, 154 (1994) (concluding that intergenerational transfers account for 51% of 
wealth). 
 62 See, e.g., A.B. ATKINSON & A.J. HARRISON, DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL WEALTH IN 
BRITAIN (1978) (concluding that wealth transfer taxes may have contributed to reduced wealth 
inequality in Great Britain over the course of the twentieth century); Paul L. Caron & James R. 
Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
153, 159–62 (2009) (concluding that the U.S. gift and estate tax has contributed to the diminution 
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prominent rationale for the taxation of wealth transfers is to decrease wealth 
inequalities by curbing concentrations of wealth. 
Although this rationale is more persuasive than revenue-raising and 
tax-equity arguments for wealth transfer taxes, it is incomplete for two rea-
sons. First, to the extent that economic inequality is, as recent studies sug-
gest, much more attributable to disparities in labor income that it is to ine-
qualities in capital income,63 it is not clear why a wealth transfer tax that 
addresses only one cause of this inequality should be favored over other 
measures aimed at these other causes of economic inequality. More general-
ly, if the only objective of the tax is to curb concentrations of wealth irre-
spective of their cause, it is not clear why a wealth transfer tax is preferable 
to a periodic or extraordinary wealth tax that could target wealth inequality 
directly. Indeed, one scholar has proposed an annual wealth tax, rather than 
a wealth transfer tax, as a key response to increasing wealth inequality.64 
Although one might fall back on a wealth transfer tax as an administra-
tively simpler alternative to an annual wealth tax, which faces formidable 
challenges of valuation,65 this response is unsatisfactory to the extent that it 
depends on the assumption that all wealth, however derived, is a legitimate 
source for redistributive taxation—an assumption that at least some advo-
cates of wealth transfer taxation have questioned.66 Instead, as the following 
section argues,67 the unique virtue of a wealth transfer tax is to target un-
earned sources of wealth that not only contribute to wealth inequality, but 
do so on a way that perpetuates dynastic concentrations of wealth and pow-
er and undermine fair equality of opportunity. 
D. Regulating the Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth 
Although extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth are them-
selves detrimental to democracy, social stability, and economic growth, ex-
treme inequalities in the distribution of inherited wealth are a much greater 
concern—perpetuating political and economic power from one generation 
to the next, undermining fair equality of opportunity, and allowing distribu-
                                                                                                                           
of large accumulations of wealth by encouraging charitable giving and imposing a significant 
burden on estates that are subject to the tax). 
 63 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DIVIDED WE STAND: WHY INEQUALITY 
KEEPS RISING (2011), https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49170768.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7KJ-6B59] 
(analyzing the cause of rising inequity). 
 64 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 515–34 (2014). 
 65 See James R. Repetti, Commentary, It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607 (2000) 
(proposing valuation methods for a wealth tax and explaining the problems with certain valuation 
methods). 
 66 See Rakowski, supra note 55 (evaluating wealth taxation from the perspective of distribu-
tive justice). 
 67 See infra notes 68–80 and accompanying text. 
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tive outcomes to be substantially influenced by the intergenerational trans-
mission of vast fortunes that are essentially unearned by their recipients. 
Beginning with political power, it is often remarked that dynastic con-
centrations of wealth pose a much greater threat to democratic institutions 
than concentrations of wealth that are confined within a single generation. As 
Alexis de Tocqueville famously wrote: “What is most important for democra-
cy is not that great fortunes should not exist, but that great fortunes should not 
remain in the same hands.”68 For this reason, as the Ontario Committee on 
Taxation concluded in 1967, taxes on the transfer of wealth are “an essential 
safeguard to the fabric of a democratic society”—controlling “the growth . . . 
of an economically powerful minority whose influence is based on inherited 
wealth.”69 
Likewise with economic power, it is often noted that the intergenera-
tional transmission of assets and enterprises can impede economic growth 
and efficiency by preventing the transfer of assets to their most highly valued 
uses,70 depriving enterprises of more talented managers,71 and discouraging 
work effort on the part of heirs.72 At the same time, although critics insist that 
wealth transfer taxes discourage capital accumulation and discourage eco-
nomic growth,73 empirical studies suggest that wealth transfer taxes have 
relatively little impact on the magnitude of wealth transfers74—a finding that 
is consistent with theoretical analysis suggesting that the motives for leaving 
a bequest are mixed, including accidental bequests on which wealth transfer 
taxes have no impact and altruistic bequests for which wealth transfer taxes 
                                                                                                                           
 68 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 85 n.E (Eduardo Nolla ed., James 
T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund Inc., Historical-Critical ed. 2010) (1835), http://lf-oll.s3.amazon
aws.com/titles/2285/Tocqueville_1532.01_LFeBk.pdf [https://perma.cc/29SJ-7CT6]. 
 69 3 ONT. COMM. ON TAXATION, THE PROVISIONAL REVENUE SYSTEM 136 (1967), https://
archive.org/details/reporttaxation03onta [https://perma.cc/2LGV-29UU]. 
 70 See, e.g., SANDFORD, supra note 18, at 38–39 (providing an example of such through dis-
cussing the history of the British death duty); Bird, supra note 53, at 20. 
 71 See, e.g., C.T. SANDFORD ET AL., AN ACCESSIONS TAX 137–42 (1973) (examining the 
consequences of a replacement of the estate duty in the United Kingdom with a cumulative tax on 
gift and inheritance recipients). 
 72 See, e.g., SHOUP, supra note 54, at 89 (discussing the effect on heirs); Bird, supra note 53, 
at 17–18 (providing an example of this in a discussion on Canadian estate tax). 
 73 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE 
L.J. 283, 289–97 (1994) (providing the liberal egalitarian viewpoint that both supports and rejects 
taxation of wealth transfer); David A. Ward, The Case Against Capital Taxes, 2 CAN. TAX’N 31 
(1980) (arguing that further taxation of wealth will have a “probably detrimental effect on the 
Canadian economy”). 
 74 See, e.g., Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on Wealth Ac-
cumulation and Avoidance Behavior, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 299 (William 
G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (analyzing whether estate taxation affects donor behavior); David 
Joulfaian, The Behavioral Response of Wealth Accumulation to Estate Taxation: Time Series Evi-
dence, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 253 (2006) (exploring “behavioral response of taxable bequests to estate 
taxation”). 
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can encourage increased saving in order to maintain a targeted bequest after 
tax.75 As a result, the inheritance of economic power may be even more det-
rimental to economic growth and efficiency than the concentration of eco-
nomic power within a single generation. 
In addition to these political and economic concerns, the intergenera-
tional transmission of substantial fortunes contradicts basic principles of 
fair equality of opportunity and equal concern for all citizens that are central 
to liberal conceptions of distributive justice.76 As Rawls explains, fair equal-
ity of opportunity is essential to a conception of distributive justice in which 
social and economic inequalities are justified on the basis that they are rea-
sonably expected to contribute to everyone’s advantage.77 For this reason, 
he maintains, progressive gift and inheritance taxes are necessary “not to 
raise revenue . . . but gradually and continually to correct the distribution of 
wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value 
of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.”78 Similarly, Ronald 
Dworkin concludes that “it is unjust” for a political community that regards 
its citizens with equal concern to allow some people to “lead their lives with 
less wealth available to them . . . than others, not through some choice or 
gamble of their own but through brute bad luck.”79 For this reason, he also 
advocates “an inheritance tax, at a steeply progressive rate” in order to 
moderate inequalities in the intergenerational transmission of wealth—
suggesting that revenues from this tax should be devoted to “improved pub-
lic education, education and training loans for would-be professionals, and 
other programs that ease the impact of whatever economic stratification 
remains after the tax has been levied.”80 In addition to concerns about inter-
generational transmission of political and economic power, these theories of 
distributive justice support a distinct tax on the transfer of inherited wealth 
in order to reduce unearned concentrations of wealth and power and ensure 
fair equality of opportunity. 
                                                                                                                           
 75 For an excellent summary of this literature, see Batchelder, supra note 7, at 36–38 (con-
cluding on the basis of existing literature that roughly 50% of wealth transfers are accidental and 
approximately 20% altruistic). 
 76 For more detailed arguments to this effect, see Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and 
Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469 (2007); Duff, supra note 2, at 45–62; Eric Rakow-
ski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419, 420–37 (1996). 
 77 RAWLS, supra note 8, at 73, 83–90. 
 78 Id. at 277. 
 79 DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 347. 
 80 Id. at 349. 
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II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE GIFT AND ESTATE TAX 
If the primary purpose of a tax on the transfer of wealth is to regulate 
the intergenerational transmission of substantial fortunes in order to reduce 
unearned concentrations of wealth and power and ensure fair equality of 
opportunity, the current gift and estate tax is deficient, because it applies to 
donors rather than recipients of inherited wealth, and varies according to the 
aggregate value of a donor’s inter vivos gifts and bequests rather than the 
amounts that individual beneficiaries receive. For these reasons, the gift and 
estate tax is also vulnerable to the criticism that it constitutes a “double tax” 
on thrifty and hardworking individuals who manage to accumulate wealth 
during their lifetimes.81 
Instead of defending the current tax, therefore, it may be more useful 
to consider alternative approaches that might better serve the primary pur-
pose of a wealth transfer tax and may, for this reason, be easier to justify 
and defend. This Part considers the four most prominent alternatives to the 
current gift and estate tax: (1) an annual wealth tax (section A);82 (2) taxing 
unrealized gains when property is transferred by gift or at death (section 
B);83 (3) including gifts and inheritances in the recipient’s income (section 
C);84 and (4) a lifetime accessions tax (section D).85 It concludes that the 
last of these approaches best fulfills the purpose of a wealth transfer tax to 
regulate the intergenerational transmission of substantial fortunes and is 
more likely to attract political support than the current tax. 
A. Annual Wealth Tax 
As explained earlier, supporters of a periodic or annual tax on net 
wealth often do so because it would recognize a form of ability to pay that 
is not otherwise taken into account under a realization-based income tax.86 
Others advocate periodic wealth taxes on explicitly redistributive grounds 
as a response to increasing wealth inequality.87 As an alternative to the cur-
rent gift and estate tax, some might also favor an annual wealth tax on the 
grounds that a low-rate tax levied on a recurring basis might be less suscep-
tible to avoidance and tax planning than a much higher-rate tax that is im-
posed mainly at death. 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Grave Robbers: The Moral Case Against the Death Tax, 
85 TAX NOTES 1429, 1436–40 (1999) (arguing that a fair tax system should tax immediate con-
sumption). 
 82 See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
 86 Supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 87 See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 64, at 471–539. 
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Whatever the merits of these arguments, a periodic tax on net wealth is 
a poor substitute for a wealth transfer tax that is designed to reduce un-
earned concentrations of wealth and power and ensure fair equality of op-
portunity—because it applies to all wealth, whether earned or unearned, and 
does not distinguish between inherited wealth that contributes to unequal 
opportunities, and accumulated wealth that may result from prior decisions 
to work and to save. Indeed, to the extent that a periodic wealth tax imposes 
an additional burden on income that is earned and saved, it is as vulnerable 
as the current gift and estate tax to the criticism that it results in double tax-
ation, and is arguably more difficult to justify than a wealth transfer tax that 
applies only to the fortunate recipients of substantial inheritances.88 As a 
practical matter, moreover, annual wealth taxes also face formidable chal-
lenges of valuation, making them more difficult and costly to administer 
than taxes on the transfer of wealth, when valuations are often required for 
estate administration purposes. For all these reasons, an annual wealth tax 
would be an unsatisfactory alternative to the gift and estate tax. 
B. Taxing Unrealized Gains 
Another alternative to the gift and estate tax might be to repeal the car-
ryover basis rule in § 1015 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) and the 
stepped-up basis rule in § 1014, and instead tax unrealized gains when 
property is transferred by gift or at death.89 Widely regarded as a useful re-
form to improve the equity and efficiency of the income tax by preventing 
the unlimited deferral and exemption of unrealized gains,90 this approach 
has also been proposed as a way to maintain at least some of the goals of 
the gift and estate tax if these taxes are repealed—potentially recouping “all 
or a major portion of the revenue lost under transfer tax repeal,”91 achieving 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Compare Rakowski, supra note 55 (objecting to an annual wealth tax on the grounds of 
justice), with Rakowski, supra note 76 (supporting a wealth transfer tax on the grounds of justice). 
 89 I.R.C. §§ 1014–1015 (2012). Yet another alternative might be to retain the carryover basis 
rule for gifts and extend this rule to transfers at death. See, e.g., Nancy M. Annick, Plugging the 
“Gaping Loophole” of the Step-up in Basis at Death: A Proposal to Apply Carryover Basis to 
Excess Property, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 75, 107–20 (2011); Calvin H. Johnson, The Elephant in the 
Parlor: Repeal of Step-up in Basis at Death, 121 TAX NOTES 1181 (2008); Krisanne M. 
Schlachter, Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our 
Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 781, 811–21 (2000). 
 90 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1827, 1838–44 (1994) (discussing the rationale for implementing carryover basis 
and repealing § 1014); Michael J. Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death—An Evaluation 
of Current Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 830, 832–38 (1973) (providing an explanation of why re-
form of the current step-up in basis rule is necessary); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 
46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 367–71 (1994) (comparing carryover basis at death and a death gains tax). 
 91 Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and 
Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REV. 421, 471 (2001). 
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a similar degree of progressivity in the distribution of the tax burden,92 and 
also “curbing undue accumulations of wealth.”93 In addition, to the extent 
that taxing both gifts and estates and unrealized gains on the transfer of 
property is regarded as inappropriate double taxation,94 replacing an unpop-
ular gift and estate tax with a deemed realization approach might be regard-
ed as an acceptable tradeoff to improve the overall tax system. In Canada, 
for example, the federal government opted to repeal its gift and estate tax 
when it introduced a tax on capital gains that included a deemed realization 
on transfers of property by gift or at death.95 
Notwithstanding its merits for the purpose of the income tax, there are 
three reasons why a deemed realization approach is unsuitable as an alterna-
tive to the gift and estate tax or an effective tax on the transfer of wealth. 
First, although studies suggest that unrealized gains represent a significant 
share of estate values, which increases as the value of the estate increases,96 
a tax on unrealized gains necessarily applies only to a fraction of all wealth 
transfers, and this portion could be expected to decrease with a deemed re-
alization rule under which the incentive to hold appreciated property until 
death would diminish. Second, although a tax on unrealized gains could 
raise more revenue than the gift and estate tax if it were applied to all or 
most gains without any exemption,97 this approach would shift the overall 
distribution of the tax toward smaller estates and away from the largest es-
tates, reducing both its progressivity and its effectiveness to limit concentra-
tions of inherited wealth. Finally, because a tax on unrealized gains applies 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id. at 476. 
 93 Id. at 529. 
 94 Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, 20 VA. L. REV. 499, 
526–27 (2001). 
 95 Duff, supra note 4, at 89–107. For some commentators, this decision demonstrates that it is 
politically impossible simultaneously to levy a wealth transfer tax and tax unrealized gains at 
death. See, e.g., Wolfe Goodman, The End of the Canadian Estate Tax—A Lesson for the U.S., 84 
TAX NOTES 1469 (1999) (discussing the politics and reasoning behind Canada’s repeal of the 
estate tax). In fact, the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Canada is much more complicated and 
had as much to do with federal-provincial revenue arrangements as with the introduction of capital 
gains tax. As a result, the Canadian experience should not necessarily be read to exclude the pos-
sibility of taxing unrealized gains at death as well as transfers of wealth—particularly if, as pro-
posed below, the wealth transfer tax applies to amounts received by beneficiaries rather than the 
gross value of a decedent’s estate. 
 96 See, e.g., James M. Poterba & Scott Weisbenner, The Distributional Burden of Taxing 
Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 
supra note 74, at 422, 439 (reporting that unrealized gains represented approximately 36% of the 
aggregate value of all estates in 1998, and 56% of the value of estates worth at least $10 million); 
Wilbur A. Steger & Frederick H. Rueter, The Revenue Effects of Estate Tax Repeal and Basis 
Step-up Limits, 107 TAX NOTES 1314, 1315 (2005) (reporting that unrealized gains represent at 
least 70% of the value of large estates). 
 97 Where a deemed realization approach is intended to complete the income tax, any exemp-
tion would be unwarranted. Dodge, supra note 90, at 1855–56. 
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to donors of wealth rather than recipients and is based on the circumstances 
of donors rather than amounts received by recipients, it suffers from the 
same deficiency as the gift and estate tax as a method of regulating inter-
generational transfers of wealth. As a result, although a tax on unrealized 
gains would be a significant improvement for the income tax, it would be a 
poor substitute for a tax on the transfer of wealth. 
C. Taxing Gifts and Inheritances as Income 
A third alternative to the gift and estate tax would be to repeal § 102 of 
the I.R.C. and include gifts and inheritance as income of recipients.98 Wide-
ly regarded as essential to the design of a comprehensive income tax,99 the 
inclusion of gifts and inheritances in income would represent a significant 
improvement on the gift and estate tax, because the tax would apply to re-
cipients of inherited wealth rather than donors, and vary according to the 
economic circumstances of recipients rather than amounts transferred by 
donors.100 To the extent that income inclusion encourages donors to direct 
gifts and bequests to less affluent recipients, this approach might also help 
reduce concentrations of wealth.101 
Despite these advantages over a donor-based tax, an income-inclusion 
approach suffers from three major deficiencies as a tax on the transfer of 
wealth. First, an income-inclusion approach would—at least in principle—
subject all gifts and inheritances to tax, which is unnecessary to achieve the 
primary objective of a wealth transfer tax to regulate the intergenerational 
transmission of wealth. For this reason, many income-inclusion proposals 
have annual exclusions and lifetime thresholds, which cause the income-
inclusion approach to resemble a lifetime accessions tax.102 Second, the rate 
at which an income-inclusion approach applies to gifts and inheritances 
would be determined by the recipient’s marginal rate in the year in which 
amounts are received, which is generally less than necessary to properly 
regulate the intergenerational transmission of wealth, but could also be ex-
cessive where a substantial transfer received in one year causes the recipient 
to pay tax at a higher marginal rate than would apply if the transfer were 
spread out over several years. For this reason, income-inclusions proposals 
generally include a supplementary tax on gratuitous transfers above a 
threshold, as well as averaging provisions to prevent the bunching of gifts 
                                                                                                                           
 98 I.R.C. § 102 (2012). 
 99 3 ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 41; SIMONS, supra note 5, at 126; 
Dodge, supra note 7, at 1179–82. 
 100 Batchelder, supra note 7, at 67–73. 
 101 Id. at 73–74. 
 102 See, e.g., id. at 59–67 (outlining administrative restraints on an ideal wealth transfer tax 
system and proposing a comprehensive inheritance tax). 
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and inheritances in a single taxation year—which again make them resem-
ble a lifetime accessions tax.103 Finally, where gifts and inheritances are 
characterized as income, it might be argued that donors should obtain a de-
duction for amounts transferred, and that the failure to grant such a deduc-
tion amounts to double taxation.104 For all these reasons, an income-
inclusion approach is both deficient as a wealth transfer tax and an unlikely 
alternative to the gift and estate tax. 
D. Lifetime Accessions Tax 
Although an income-inclusion approach may be deficient as a wealth 
transfer tax, it points toward a more attractive alternative to the gift and es-
tate tax—a lifetime accessions tax that would tax recipients of inherited 
wealth on the cumulative value of gifts and inheritances received over the 
course of their lifetimes. Like the income-inclusion approach, a lifetime ac-
cessions tax would be based on the circumstances of recipients rather than 
donors, and would encourage donors to distribute gifts and bequests more 
widely—serving the primary purpose of a wealth transfer tax to reduce con-
centrations of inherited wealth. Unlike the income-inclusion approach, a 
lifetime accessions tax would distinguish between earned income subject to 
the income tax, and unearned gifts and inheritances subject to a separate tax 
that is specifically designed to regulate the intergenerational transmission of 
wealth—thereby reducing the concentration of inherited wealth and power 
and ensuring fair equality of opportunity. For these reasons, a lifetime ac-
cessions tax should be easier to defend as a tax on the fortunate beneficiar-
ies of substantial gifts and inheritances, rather than a tax on thrifty and 
hardworking donors, and less vulnerable to the criticism that it amounts to 
double taxation.105 It might also be easier to combine such a tax with a 
deemed realization of gains on property that is transferred by gift or at 
death, because a tax on unrealized gains would apply to donors as part of 
the income tax, whereas a lifetime accessions tax would apply to net after-
tax amounts received in the form of gifts and inheritances.106 
Although this Article cannot address the design of such a tax in detail, 
key features would include: (1) an annual exclusion designed to exempt 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See, e.g., id. (outlining administrative restraints on an ideal wealth transfer tax system and 
proposing a comprehensive inheritance tax). 
 104 Burke & McCouch, supra note 94, at 547–53. 
 105 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 235. 
 106 See, e.g., Laura E. Cunningham & Noël B. Cunningham, Commentary, Realization of 
Gains Under the Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 271 (2009) (discussing the 
coupling of comprehensive income taxation with “a rule that taxes gratuitous transfers as realiza-
tion events, resulting in inclusion of the appreciation in the income tax base of the do-
nor/decedent”). 
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reasonable gifts and support obligations; (2) a lifetime threshold designed to 
limit the tax to transfers of substantial amounts; (3) exemptions for transfers 
to spouses and charities, and; (4) progressive rates that might reasonably 
increase to a rate significantly higher than the top marginal income tax 
rate.107 In addition, given the purpose of the tax to reduce concentrations of 
inherited wealth and power and ensure fair equality of opportunity, revenues 
might reasonably be dedicated toward education and training programs de-
signed to promote opportunities and reduce economic stratification.108 
CONCLUSION 
Although the gift and estate tax may have survived its near-death expe-
rience in 2010, it remains deeply unpopular and politically vulnerable. This 
condition is partly attributable to an extended campaign that “anti-death 
tax” advocates have waged against the tax over the past two decades,109 but 
is also attributable to the form of the tax, which applies to donors rather 
than recipients and is therefore easily characterized as an unfair double tax 
on thrifty and hardworking donors, rather than a tax on unearned gifts and 
inheritances that perpetuates dynastic concentrations of wealth and power 
and undermines fair equality of opportunity. In contrast, a lifetime acces-
sions tax best serves the primary purpose of a wealth transfer tax to reduce 
the concentration of inherited wealth and power and ensure fair equality of 
opportunity, and is more likely to attract the kind of political and popular 
support that will enable a federal wealth transfer tax to survive another hun-
dred years. 
                                                                                                                           
 107 For detailed treatments of essential issues in the design of a lifetime accessions tax, see 
Alstott, supra note 76, at 501–42 (detailing important considerations when creating an “equal 
opportunity inheritance tax”); Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax with a Reimagined 
Accessions Tax, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1014–61 (2009) (examining the “principal issues relating 
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